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Rising energy prices and climate change have
changed both the economics and politics of elec-
tricity. In response, over half the states have enact-
ed “renewable portfolio standards” (RPS) that
require utilities to obtain some power from “re-
newable” generation resources rather than carbon-
emitting fossil fuels. Reports of state-level success
have brought proposals for a national standard.
Like several predecessor Congresses, however, the
most recent one failed to pass RPS legislation.
Before trying onemore time, legislators should
ask why they favor a policy so politically correct
and so economically suspect. Support for a
national program largely stems from misleading
claims about state-level successes,misunderstand-
ings about how renewables interact with other
environmental regulation, and misinformation
about the actual benefits renewables create.
State RPS programs are largely in disarray, and
even the apparently successful ones have had little
impact. California’s supposedly aggressive pro-
gram has left it with the same percentage of
renewable power as in 1998, and Texas’s seeming-
ly impressive wind turbine investments produce
only two percent of its electricity. The public may
envision solar collectors but wind accounts for
almost all of the growth in renewable power, and
it largely survives on favorable tax treatment.
Wind’s intermittency reduces its efficacy in carbon
control because it requires extra conventional gen-
eration reserves. Computer-generated predictions
about a national RPS are generally unreliable, but
they show that with or without one the great
majority of generation investments for the next
several decades will be fossil-fueled.
Even without the technological and environ-
mental shortcomings of renewables, the case for a
national RPS is economically flawed. Emissions
policies aremoving toward efficientmarket-based
trading systems andmore rational setting of stan-
dards. A national RPS clashes with principles of
efficient environmental policy because it is a tech-
nological requirement that applies to a single
industry. Arguments that a national RPS will cre-
ate jobs, mitigate energy price risks, improve
national security andmake theUnited Satesmore
competitive internationally are in the main
restatements of elementary economic fallacies. It
is hard to imagine a program that delivers as little
in theory as a national RPS, and the experiences of
the states indicate that it delivers equally little in
practice.
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Introduction
High expectations for “renewable energy”
unite activists whodecry America’s reliance on
foreignoil, the high cost of fossil fuels, and the
environmental damage they cause. By con-
trast, the public’s knowledge of renewables is
spotty and has not noticeably improved with
increasedmedia coverage.1 Nevertheless, opin-
ion polls increasingly showmajorities in favor
of deploying more renewables to cope with
environmental pollution and climate change.
Current renewables policies emphasize
four types of generation, which donot include
all sources (such as hydroelectric power) that
in reality renew themselves:
• Biomass andWaste Conversion burnmateri-
als to heat water and turn a turbine.
Biomass can be the residue of a commer-
cial crop such as cornstalks or pressed
sugar cane, or it can be remnants of tree
cutting and lumber manufacture. Waste
includes discarded organic materials and
solids, as well as landfill gas.
• Geothermal Energy uses underground
heat sources, primarily volcanic magma,
to heat water and produce steam. It gen-
erally involves the sinking of pipes con-
taining the water to be heated.
• Wind Energy uses a rotor and gearing
mechanism to turn a turbine when wind
is blowing at it.
• Solar Energy is of two types. Photovoltaic
energy is created when sunlight strikes a
surface coating and energizes it to react
with a substrate to produce direct cur-
rent. Thermal energy can either be “pas-
sive,” like water heating when exposed to
sunlight, or “active,” as when several mir-
rors direct sunlight at a water container
that will boil and create steam.
The Economics of Renewable Energy
Figure 1 shows U.S annual power produc-
tion in millions of kilowatt-hours (MKWh,
also known as gigawatt-hours GWh) by type
of generator from 1990 to 2006. Over the
period it grew by an average of 1.84 percent
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly, various issues.
3575_PA627_1stClass:3575_PA627_1stClass  10/30/2008  7:09 AM  Page 2
per year.2 Because generators of all types have
physical life-spans of 20 or more years and
can often be repowered and retrofitted with
pollution controls at reasonable cost, the rel-
ative magnitudes in the figure will persist for
some time.
Figures 2 and 3 show both constancy and
change in power production by source. Renew-
ableshavebeenthebeneficiariesofbothprivate
and public investments in research and pro-
duction, and advocates claim that some of
them are competitive with conventional gener-
ators, at least in certain applications. Despite
the trends and claims, however, most utilities
obtain negligible percentages of their power
supplies from renewables. Moreover, the share
ofproductionby renewableshas changed little,
moving from 2.03 percent in 1990 to 2.15 per-
cent in 2005 and 2.39 percent in 2006.3 That’s
all themore surprising given that environmen-
tal regulation has increased the cost of conven-
tional power generation.
Figures4and5 showsubstantial changes in
the relative contributionof various renewables.
Biomass (wasteandwood)conversion fell from
72.5 percent to 57.5 percent of renewable pro-
duction between 1991 and 2006.4 Geothermal
fell from 22.8 to 15.3 percent while solar re-
mained a tiny (and declining) percentage. The
biggest gainer was wind power, up from 4.2
percent to 26.7 percent.
The continuing insignificanceof renewable
energy is striking, particularlywhen compared
with the range of government policies adopt-
ed to promote it over the past several decades.
Both federal and state governments have
granted direct payments to producers or indi-
rect transfers like the federal Production Tax
Credit for power generated by wind, sunlight
and biomass burning, currently inflation-
adjusted to1.9 cents per kilowatt-hour.5Other
indirect support has included tax-funded
research andpreferential operating rules (such
as California’s) that prioritize renewable ener-
gy dispatch even when more cost-effective
power sources are available.6 Finally, policies
designed to raise the cost of conventionally
produced electricity can make renewables
3
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Percentage of U.S. Electricity by Type of Generator, 1990
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electric Power Monthly, various issues.
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Figure 3
Percentage of U.S. Electricity by Type of Generator, 2006
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Figure 4
Percent of Renewable Generation by Source, 1991
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more attractive. Such policies include design
standards or retrofit requirements for pollu-
tion controls, fuel regulations such as limita-
tions on the sulfur content of coal, locational
restrictions, and onerous siting procedures.
The continuinghigh cost of renewable ener-
gy has rendered it a minor presence. Table 1
provides 2004 levelized costs (defined as capital
costs plus operation and maintenance costs
over the lifetimeof a facility dividedby the total
power producedover that lifetime) per kilowatt
hour (kWh) for conventional and renewable
plants.7 It shows production costs per kWh cal-
culated under current law, current law without
thefederal energyproductiontaxcredit, current
law without the federal investment tax credit,
current law with economic rather than acceler-
ated depreciation, a tax regime providing no
investment preferences (“level playing field”),
and costs assuming zero taxes.
Even if their production costs are competi-
tive, locational constraints on renewables add
other important costs that do not apply to
conventional plants. Because pipelines and
railroads can deliver fuel to the latter, conven-
tional plants can be sited with due considera-
tion for reliability and the cost ofmoving their
power to consumers. A grid’s reliability varies
with the placement of its generators, and
transmission line losses increasewithdistance.
Wind turbines, however, are best located on
open, remote plainswhere thewind blows reg-
ularly. “Active” solar collectors require large
fields with high exposure to sunlight, and the
heat that fuels geothermal plants cannot be
transferred like the heat embodied in conven-
tional fuels. Biomass conversion requires
abundant farm or logging waste, and a cost-
effective biomass generatormust be within 50
miles of its fuel source.8
The upshot is that renewable generators
typically require more installed transmission
capacity than conventional ones, and trans-
mission costs are no minor matter. The wind
energy industry, for instance, contends that a
lackof transmission capacity is thebiggest eco-
nomic obstacle it faces.9 Accordingly, Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) is current-
ly sponsoring a bill to provide $10 billion in
bonding authority to the five regional federal
power administrations for transmission lines
intended to reach renewable facilities .10
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Sporadic operation of many renewable
energy facilities compounds the problems of
locational specificity. Wind turbines only pro-
duce when the wind blows and cannot be dis-
patched like conventional powerplants when
they are needed for system reliability. Storage
technologies for large amounts of electricity
are still on the distant horizon and will in any
case be expensive. Accordingly, most wind
power and solar power plants require addi-
tional provisions for reserves, a topic discussed
in more detail below. Moreover, transmission
that links sporadically available power sources
to distant consumers will only occasionally be
used to capacity.
The locational needs associated withmany
renewable energy sources have other conse-
quences. First, generating equipment can be
mass-produced, but sites cannot. The U.S.
Department of Energy has expressed concern
that the best available wind sites are already in
use, and even if generation technology contin-
ues to improve, newer installations will be less
productive than earlier ones.11 Second, a
national RPS would have to account for inter-
state disparities in available renewable sites. It
is generally agreed that somemarket for “cred-
its” must emerge, in which utilities with few
nearby renewables can purchase claims on
output from distant producers to fulfill their
RPS requirements. A credit systemmaybenec-
essary for efficiency, but legislators will soon
notice (if they have not already) that some of
them represent areas that will consistently
profit from the sale of credits and others rep-
resent areas whose residents must continually
pay for them. Third, generators bidding in
competitive power markets must generally
commit themselves a day in advance of opera-
tion due to startup and shutdown costs.
Adding more as-available renewables (above
some minimum threshold) and giving them
priority will increase operating costs.
The Birth of RPS
The generally poor results of earlier initia-
tives to increase generation from renewables
have led their proponents to favor production
quotas. Renewable portfolio standards (RPS)
require that a set percentage of power deliv-
ered to a utility’s customers be derived from
renewables of the types described above. As of
October 2007, 25 states and the District of
Columbia had instituted some form of RPS.12
Six other states have non-binding percentage
renewable goals. Table 2 provides a summary
of the states’ basic provisions, which some-
times also include set-asides for particular
types of renewables.
There is a great deal of support for a feder-
alRPS inbothpolitical parties.13 Byone count,
17 pieces of legislation that included a nation-
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Table 1
Real Levelized Costs of Electricity
Current No No Economic “Level Playing No
Technology Law PTC ITC Depreciation Field” Tax
Nuclear 4.31 5.55 4.31 4.70 5.94 4.57
Conventional Coal 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.79 3.79 3.10
Clean Coal (IGCC) 3.55 3.55 4.06 3.80 4.37 3.53
Natural Gas 5.47 5.47 5.47 5.61 5.61 5.29
Biomass 5.34 5.56 5.34 5.74 5.95 4.96
Wind 5.70 5.91 5.7 6.42 6.64 4.95
Solar Thermal 12.25 12.25 16.68 13.74 18.82 13.84
Solar Photovoltaic 22.99 22.99 32.6 26.34 37.39 26.64
Source: Gilbert Metcalf, “Federal Tax Policy Toward Energy,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
12568 (Oct. 2006) at 36.
Note: All figures are cents per kWh at 2004 prices. Details of assumptions and calculations are given in source.
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al RPS were introduced between 1997 and
2006.14 In June 2007, the U.S. Senate narrowly
rejected a 15 percent quota, but in August the
House of Representatives passed one.15 The
House again adopted anRPS in the energy bill
passed on December 6, 2007, but RPS propo-
nents in the Senate could not overcome a fili-
buster against the same provision and were
forced to eliminate it from the energy bill
passed later that month.16
Environmental organizations and firms
thatwouldprofit fromanRPS lead theparade
of RPS supporters, but policy elites embrace
RPS as well.17 The privately funded National
Commission on Energy Policy recommends a
federal RPS thatwill require 15 percent renew-
7
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Table 2
State Renewable Portfolio Requirements*
State Target Other Characteristics
AZ 15% by 2025 30% of renewables to be on-site after 2011, solar setaside
CA 20% by 2010 1% annual increase required
CO 20% by 2020 4% of requirement from solar, 10% overall required for municipals and coops
CT 23% by 2020 Three-tier system
DC 11% by 2022 Complex 2-tier system, requires 0.386% solar by 2022
DE 20% by 2019 2% solar by 2019
HI 20% by 2020
IL 25% by 2025 At least 75% of renewables must be wind, annual increases required
IA 105 MW, no date
MA 4% by 2009 1% annual increase also required after 2009 until regulators end requirement
MD 9.5% by 2022 2% of total power must be solar
ME 30% by 2000 10% new resources by 2017
MN 25% by 2025 Xcel Energy quota of 30% by 2020
MT 15% by 2015
NH 23.8% by 2025
NC 12.5% by 2021 10% for municipals and coops
NJ 22.5% by 2021 2% of renewable generation to be solar
NM 20% by 2020
NV 20% by 2015 5% of total to be solar, energy efficiency credits up to 25% of total
NY 24% by 2013 1% of generation to be customer-sited renewables
OR 25% by 2025 5–10% for smaller utilities
PA 18% by 2020, 8% 0.5% solar by 2020
Tier 1 (renew-
ables), 10% Tier 2
(includes non-re-
newables)
RI 16% by 2020 1% annual increases required
TX 5,880 MW by 2015
WA 15% by 2020
WI 10% by 2015 Utilities have different percentage requirements
Sources: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency (DSIRE), “Renewable Portfolio Standards,” map
at http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/SummaryMaps/RPS_Map.ppt and Pew Center on Global Climate Change,
“States with Renewable Portfolio Standards,” http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/rps.cfm.
*Some states have non-binding goals. They include Missouri (11% by 2020), North Dakota (10% by 2015), South
Dakota (10% by 2015), Utah (20% by 2025), Vermont (renewables to meet load growth by 2012), and Virginia (12%
by 2022) North Dakota (10% by 2015), Vermont (renewables to meet load growth by 2012), and Virginia (12% by
2022).
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able power by 2020.18 Consulting firms fre-
quently issue encouraging public reports.19
Public policy intellectuals are almost uniform-
ly supportive of RPS.20
Private support for RPS is reinforced by
governmental agency support. The U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency cannot offi-
cially lobby for a national standard, but agency
documents suggest support for state pro-
grams.21
Finally, a number of utilities that would be
subject to RPS have also embraced it. South-
eastern utilities played amajor role in derailing
RPS in the Senate’s 2007 energy bill, but sup-
porters include Pacific Gas & Electric’s Peter
Darbee and National Commission on Energy
Policy Co-Chair JohnRowe of ExelonCorpora-
tion, the parent of Chicago’s Commonwealth
Edison and Philadelphia’s PECO.22
A national RPS is being sold to policymak-
ers as something akin to a free lunch, with an
amazingly large roster of social and economic
benefits. Proponents claim that it will:
• improve environmental quality and
reduce greenhouse gas emissions;
• reduce demand for natural gas to such
an extent that the slightly higher elec-
tricity prices that an RPS might deliver
would be more than offset by declining
natural gas prices;
• so stimulate the renewable energy sector
that production costs will decline, both
hastening andmaking an inevitable tran-
sition away from fossil fuels less painful;
• allow America to dominate the renew-
able energy business, and the increased
exports that follow will create jobs to
replace those lost from reduced conven-
tional power production;
• reduce price volatility in electricity mar-
kets because renewableswill growprimar-
ily at the expense of natural gas-fired pro-
duction, whose costs are determined in
the highly volatile natural gasmarket;
• reduce future generation requirements
because a properly designed RPS can be
better coordinated with policies for
demand management and with energy
efficiency standards for appliances and
lighting;
• enhance economic efficiency by allowing
firms to trade renewable energy credits in
the same manner that business trade
SO2 emission allowances under the 1990
Clean Air Act; and
• move foreignpolicy in apositive direction
by freeing us fromdependence on distant
and unstable energy sources, while simul-
taneously allowing us to set a positive
example for the world as it moves into a
climate-constrained future.
This study examines the above claims and
finds them without merit. First, I examine the
regulatory architecture of state RPS laws and
discover that they are poorly designed and inef-
fective, with loopholes, exceptions, and ambigu-
ous language that can be used to suggest com-
pliance with unreachable targets. Second, I
examine the content of the California RPS and
utility responses to it ingreaterdepthaspossible
indicatorsofhowanationalRPSmightplayout
in practice. Third, I critically examine themeth-
ods and results of cost-benefit studies that have
analyzed a national RPS, and conclude that its
environmental effectswill bemoremodest than
expected and its consumer benefitsmay well be
negative. Fourth, I consider the environmental
case for an RPS and conclude that renewable
energy mandates are poor tools for addressing
environmental “market failures.” Fifth and
finally, I find reason to reject themacroeconom-
ic case for anRPS as a “job creation” program.
The Regulatory Architecture
of RPS Programs
RPS standards differ significantly from
state to state, and those differences are impor-
tant determinants of their costs and benefits.
Accordingly, the regulatory architecture of
state programs warrants further examination.
Broadly, economic considerations often ap-
pear secondary to political considerations in
RPS design. Exceptions and provisions that
allow non-compliance probably reflect the
8
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high costs of full compliance in many states.
Rather than science or economics, politics
often determines whether a resource is or is
not renewable. Whatever attraction RPS pro-
grams might have in theory, they are far less
attractive in fact. The actual experience with
RPS at the state level is a powerful argument
against extending it to the nation.
Targets and Timetables
All state RPS laws specify dates by which
utilities are tomeet their requirements.23 There
are few indications, however, that regulators or
elected officials have set their targets on the
basis of an economic (benefit-cost) analysis.24
Instead the standards have been largely deter-
minedby rhetoric rather than forecasts of their
actual effects.25 A higher target (if it is actually
met) putsmore renewables in place but proba-
bly at higher costs per unit of capacity if con-
structionmust be rushed or inferior sitesmust
be used.
Almost every RPS state has also set inter-
mediate targets. California’s 2002 renewables
law (as amended in 2005), for instance, re-
quires 1 percent annual increases, which, if
achieved, will meet a 20 percent 2010 target.
Like final targets, intermediate ones are more
grounded in politics than economics. Some
advocates expect that the enactment of unat-
tainable targets will intensify the search for
breakthrough technologies, but regulatory
reality may say otherwise. A utility facing an
RPS may prefer familiar resources over
unproven ones, knowing that regulators have
previously allowed pass-through of the form-
ers’ costs. More speculative technologies that
fail can put the utility out of compliance and
at risk of regulatory disallowances for impru-
dence.26 Managerial risk aversion may partial-
ly explain the dominance of wind resources in
most RPS states and the generally low use of
novel technologies.
Almost all RPS states have cost caps, some
in the form of maximum prices for purchased
renewables and others as maximum allowable
increases on consumers’ bills. If no qualifying
power is available for less than the cap, the util-
ity is exempted from its RPS requirement.27
Once again, little or no evidence is available to
suggest that economic analysis played a role in
setting these caps. Finally, some states allow
out-of-state resources to satisfy their RPS,
while others have in-state restrictions. The lat-
ter, however, may soon result in constitutional
litigation.
Defining “Renewable”
AnyRPSmustdefine “renewable.”The task
is not as easy as it appears because both poli-
tics and technology matter. Table 3 shows the
energy sources that qualified in 2006 under
various state RPS.
As a group, these states agree on only
three technologies; biomass conversion, solar
photovoltaic and wind.28
• Reserves of fossil fuels grow through dis-
covery, butmost stateRPSprograms treat
them as literally nonrenewable. Among
the exceptions, Pennsylvania treats coal
waste as renewable and Maine does like-
wise for efficient gas-fired generators.
• Some states call gas-burning fuel cells
renewable, others require them to use
renewable energy sources, and still oth-
ers disqualify all fuel cells.
• Uranium is technically “non-renew-
able,” but supplies are so abundant that
depletion is no real concern. Even if
nuclear energy is de facto renewable, no
state includes it.
• Waste-to-energy facilities burn trash, a
resource hardly at risk of “depletion.”
Only nine states, however, define it as
renewable.
• Rivers and reservoirs regularly renew
themselves butmostRPS states only call
small hydroelectric facilities (5 to 60
megawatts (MW)) renewable.29
• Most RPS states lump all renewables to-
gether into equivalent megawatts regard-
less of their technologies and operational
characteristics. Others, like Connecticut
and Pennsylvania, have “tiers” for more
exotic (solar) and less exotic (waste burn-
ing)sources.Stillothershaveset-asides like
Nevada’s 5 percent solar requirement.
10
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Demand management (“conservation”)
can substitute for energy production fromany
source, but RPS programs seldom consider it.
Complex “Integrated Resource Planning”
(IRP) regimes such as California’s claim to
treat conservation symmetrically with genera-
tion as a source of “electricity services.”30 If
they are symmetric, however, an RPS devoted
exclusively to renewables or uncoordinated
with demandmanagement will surely be inef-
ficient.31
Demand management often takes the
form of rate schedules with provisions such as
real-time pricing or interruptibility intended
tomake users realize the full cost of the power
they are consuming that moment. Regulators
have given little attention to the relationships
between time-sensitive rates and renewables,
whichmay be important becausemost renew-
ables operate only sporadically and changes in
their availability can impose important costs
on utilities and their customers.
Regulatory Institutions
RPS exemplifies a quota obligation in which
government sets agoal, timetable, andpenalties
for noncompliance. Three basic mechanisms
are in use to implement and monitor renew-
ables policy:
• A utility chooses how to meet the goal,
but further regulatory intervention in
the planning process may be possible.
• A feed-in tariff fixes the amount that the
utility or government will pay for a unit
of renewable energy or capacity. Users
may pay the tariff in full, or it may be
subsidized.
• In a tender system the utility or govern-
ment specifies an amount of renewable
capacity or energy and accepts the low-
est qualifying offer(s) to supply it.32
Any of these could in principle minimize
the cost of procuring a given quantity of
renewable energy. For instance, assume a quo-
ta of 1,000 MW of renewable energy capacity.
One producer canmake up to 600MW for $1
million per MW, and several others can pro-
duce any desired quantity for $2million. If the
buyer knew everyone’s cost (and was a good
bargainer) it could offer just over $1million to
the first supplier and just over $2 million to
one or more of the others.
Such knowledge is unlikely, so instead,
assume a feed-in tariff of just over $2 million.
The first producer will happily take the offer
and the rest will come from those with higher
costs (Some other rules must ration the last
400MW among those offering to supply it).
Alternatively, assume a tender system in
which the buyer accepts offers up to a total of
1,000 MW. The first producer will offer
between $1 and $2 million, and some of the
others will supply the rest. Both the quota and
the feed-in tariff are economically efficient.
There is no way to get this quantity of renew-
ables for a smaller value of alternatives.
The cost of generating renewable energy
varies by facility and is often not public infor-
mation. If sellers privately submit bids and
each winner is paid the highest bid accepted—
as is the case in a tender system—each seller’s
best strategy is to bid its true costs.33 Winning
bidders subsequently have an incentive to pro-
duce efficiently because they retain the differ-
ence between their bids and their costs.
A feed-in system requires the buyer to set a
price, but without accurate information
about sellers’ costs it will probably set the
wrong price. The buyer will either offer too
little and fall short of its desired amount or
offer more than is necessary for it.
Some renewable energy advocates prefer a
feed-in system because it gives suppliers price
certainty.34 A tender system’smarket-clearing
price, however, also provides certainty. State
price-setting experiences under the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 sug-
gest that prices under a feed-in system will
often be set incorrectly and be politically dif-
ficult to adjust.35
Different mechanisms provide different
incentives for innovation. In principle, a feed-
in tariff will outperform a tender system (at
least for the final units to be supplied) because
an innovator will keep all of the difference
between the offered price and its own costs.
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Under a tender system, if higher cost produc-
ers lower their costs by innovating, market
price will fall and, with it, the return to non-
innovating producers. Tradable credits con-
centrate inventive efforts on those technolo-
gies that are closest to maturity, rather than
those whose costs will drop by more if efforts
are made over longer periods.36
Even efficient feed-ins and tender systems
for renewable energy may make energy mar-
kets more inefficient. The remarkable rise in
the efficiency of gas-fired generation in the
1980s and 1990s, for instance, suggests that
considerable improvements in conventional
plants are still possible. Both feed-in and ten-
der systems, however, only provide incentives
for improving the efficiency of renewables,
potentially ”crowding out” more efficient
technologies in conventional generation.37
Compliance and Trading
All state RPS programs require regular
reports from utilities on compliance with
their timetables. Compliance, however, has
been specified in ways that range from full
integration of renewables to the signing of
contracts for facilities yet to receive construc-
tion permits. As the general failure of states
to comply becomes evident (see below), some
like California have chosen to redefine com-
pliance downward, even in the face of legal
provisions that require actual operation of a
plant.
In most RPS states, compliance can be
achieved by direct utility investments, operat-
ing arrangements with non-utility renew-
ables owners, or the purchase of Renewable
Energy Credits (RECs). A utility short of its
RPS requirementmust pay amarket price for
credits that give it a claim on a qualifying
renewable source. In principle, REC markets
can facilitate new investments while allowing
resource-poor utilities to achieve compliance.
Currently REC markets are regional in
scope. They exchange credits at market
prices, typically bundledwith power from the
12
Even efficient
feed-ins and
tender systems
for renewable
energy may make
energy markets
more inefficient.
Figure 6
Compliance REC Prices in Various States, 2002–2006
Ryan Wiser et al., “Renewables Portfolio Standards: A Factual Introduction to Experience from the United States,”
LBNL-62569, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, April 2007, p. 11.
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credited source.38 If eligible capacity is tight,
they will sell at roughly the premium for a
renewable over a conventional source.
Almost all state REC markets, however,
have ceiling prices. If no capacity is available
at the ceiling, some require payments from
utilities to fund renewable research or subsi-
dies. In some regulatory systems utilities can
pass such charges on to their ratepayers.
RECs may be traded as their holders desire,
but in practice an REC market operates on a
razor’s edge. When capacity is insufficient, the
ceiling price prevails. But when it grows to
exceed the RPS, a credit becomes almost worth-
less.
This uncertainty leaves renewables develop-
ers unable to collateralize REC revenues for
financing, and price ceilings prohibit them
from realizing the scarcity values of their plants
when capacity is short. If eligible renewables are
scarce, RECs will trade in thin markets whose
prices will have less information content.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of REC
prices in some states that have relatively liq-
uid markets.39
It is difficult to make generalizations about
the data; each state’s experience has beendiffer-
ent. Maine’s existing biomass (wood chip) con-
version capacity, for instance, exceeds its RPS
requirement, and its RECs accordingly sell for
negligible prices. Massachusetts’ prices have in-
creased as its utilities have experienced increas-
ing shortfalls from their annual RPS require-
ments (see below). Prices for Connecticut’s
“Class I” credits (solar, wind, new sustainable
biomass, and others) began high and then fell
radically after a regulatory redefinition of eligi-
ble biomass capacity made it temporarily
redundant. Credits against New Jersey’s solar
set-aside requirement (measured on the right-
handaxis) currently carry extremelyhighprices.
Unlike most other states, New Jersey has no
price ceilings.
Still, renewable contracts and credits cur-
rently have onlyminor impacts on retail rates
inmost states because they are still in the ear-
ly stages of their phase-ins. Rates thus far
have increased only from 0.1 percent (Maine)
to 1.1 percent (Massachusetts).40
Utilities can meet state requirements by
purchasing RECs, but credits are not the same
as power itself. A source of RECs that is not
interconnected with the RPS state—or is not
dispatchable for other reasons—will be worth
less to the grid operator and require addition-
al arrangements to ensure reliability.41 In some
states a utilitymay purchaseRECs fromagen-
erator who cannot economically deliver the
power to the utility’s territory.
States vary in their interconnection require-
ments for RECs. At one extreme are the few
that require in-state sources, possibly in viola-
tion of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.
California and some others require deliverabil-
ity into the state, which may both satisfy the
Commerce Clause and allow Californians to
enjoy some of the renewables’ benefits.42 A few
others allow deliveries anywhere and do not
require interconnections.
Howeverwell or poorly they function, REC
markets matter for compliance. Even under
favorable assumptions about state funding of
supplemental payments for renewables (see
below), California will require an RECmarket
if it is to come into compliance with its own
standards.43 RECs may also be important
obstacles to a national RPS. At least for the
medium term, some utilities will see steady
deficits and others will get long-lived streams
of REC payments from them.44
The creditingmechanism is inequitable in
a second way. If air quality is localized, a
renewable may benefit those who reside near
it and not those served by a distant utility
that buys its RECs. The latter pay higher bills
to improve the environments of others, who
can take the benefits with them because air
quality is monetized in real estate markets.
Homes in clean environments sell at premi-
ums relative to similar ones elsewhere.45 Any
further analysis depends on the degree of
localization. Supporters of a national RPS
argue that without it non-RPS states will
“free ride” and get better air without paying
for it.46 If air quality is local, however, RECs
allow people in renewable-rich areas to free
ride on credits purchased by people whose air
remains unimproved.
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The Politics of RPS
Why have some states adopted RPS while
others have not? A regression analysis helps us
to determine the characteristics of adopters
and non-adopters:
• States with high per capita income are
more likely to adopt RPS standards than
states with low per capita income.47
• RPS states have significantly lower Re-
publican voter registrations, but the
effect of Republicans vanishes when
income is added to amultiple regression.
• A higher residential price per kWh (per-
haps reflecting more stringent preexist-
ing regulation) raises the likelihood of
an RPS, but income also washes out its
effect.
• States with appointed rather than elect-
ed commissioners are more likely to
have RPS, but this effect also vanishes
when income is added to the regression.
• The probability of an RPS is unrelated to
the amount of renewable energy generat-
ing capacity in the state, and it is also
unrelated to gas price risk exposure as
measured by the percentage of gas-fired
generation. Having more coal-fired gen-
eration, however, lowers the likelihood of
an RPS, even in regressions with income
included.
• An RPS looks like a luxury good whose
purchase depends on the strength of
existing conventional energy interests.
The first states to adopt an RPS were Iowa
(1991),Massachusetts (1997),Minnesota (1997),
andNevada (1997). All were in compliance with
their initial requirements, but Massachusetts
andNevada have since fallen into deficit. Iowa’s
requirement is so small (105 MW) that compli-
anceisnotanissue.Minnesota(whosedefinition
of renewables includes hydropower) began with
an easy standard but in 2005 reset it to a goal of
20 percent by 2015. Minnesota, like Massa-
chusetts and Nevada, is also out of compliance
with its timetable.
The remarkably low level of compliance
with even modest RPS requirements warrants
further examination, particularly because
nearly all RPS states impose seemingly strin-
gent penalties for noncompliance.48 Apossible
explanation lies in the fact that most RPS
states have cost caps on renewables that can
excuse utilities from their requirements if
prices are too high.49 A national RPS might
well contain similar escape provisions.50
Enthusiasts for anationalRPSappear tobe
unaware of state-level compliance problemsor
have chosen to disregard them in the expecta-
tion that a federal standard will force compli-
ance.51 The May 2007 Electricity Journal, for
instance, contains six articles that as a group
attempt to make a comprehensive case for a
national RPS. They containmuch useful data,
but figures on state-level compliance are con-
spicuously absent, as is also the case in other
endorsements of a national RPS. Instead,
advocates like Sovacool and Cooper are quick
to tell us that California, New York, and
Nevada have “made impressive progress.”52
The Pew Center on Global Climate Change
likewise notes that “In a number of instances,
RPSs have clearly played a central role in fos-
tering rapid and significant expansion of the
amount of renewable energy provided in a
state.”53 Its report concentrates on five states,
“chosen to maximize diversity among key cri-
teria” and “intended to provide a representa-
tive sample.”54
A closer examination of those states is
instructive.
Texas
Texas’s 1999 retail choice legislation includ-
eda requirement that2,000newMWof renew-
able capacity be built by 2009 in the territories
of the five utilities that make up the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT).55 A
boom in wind turbine construction (to the
exclusion of other renewables) led to attain-
mentof that goal in early 2007. In2000 the leg-
islature raised the amount to 5,000 MW by
2015and10,000by2025,withat least500MW
of the 2025 total from renewables other than
wind. Each retail server (utilities and competi-
tive suppliers) must own capacity or obtain
creditsproportional to its shareof load.56 Since
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almost all wind generation is at some distance
from consuming areas, many retailers meet
their requirements by purchasing credits from
its owners. There is currently an active market
in these credits.57 Texas is alone among the
states in staying ahead of a meaningful renew-
able requirement. Even so, the Pew report fails
to discuss the actual contribution that renew-
ables make to the electricity system. As dis-
cussed in more detail below, during summer
peak-load periods the state’s wind units pro-
duce only 2.9 percent of their nominal capaci-
ties.58 Thus the state’s 2,800 MW of wind
equate to a considerably smaller amount of
dependable capacity.
Massachusetts
Industry restructuring brought Massachu-
setts an RPS in 1997. Pre-existing capacity suf-
ficed to meet a one percent requirement that
was in effect through 2002. In each subsequent
year the state’s utilities were to obtain 0.5 per-
cent more renewable output from new or
upgraded facilities to reach a 4 percent goal in
2009.59 Resistance from rural residents, envi-
ronmentalists, and the state’s twoU.S. Senators
has dimmed expectations that wind power
would suffice to satisfy the RPS.60 Utilities
achieved compliance in 2003 by using credits
banked in 2002. They then fell 32.6 percent
short of 2004’s 1.5 percent requirement, and by
2005 (the latest available data) the gap had
increased to 37.4 percent.61 Utilities had to pay
the state $55.13 for each deficit MWh in addi-
tion to the actual cost of obtaining or produc-
ing the power.62 Even Pew’s optimistic author
sees “considerable uncertainty regarding Mas-
sachusetts’ ability to achieve its ascending RPS
targets.”63
Nevada
The Pew report seesNevada as possibly the
next Texas. Its 2005RPS regulationsmandate
annual increases that will give renewables 20
percent of the electricity market in 2015, 5
percent of which must be solar power. One
might expect easy attainment ofNevada’s tar-
gets, given its windy deserts and proven geot-
hermal resources. In reality, the state pro-
duced no wind power at all in 2006. Nevada
Power’s (Las Vegas) and Sierra Pacific Power
(Reno) have together signed contracts for
power sufficient to comply with the state’s 9
percent 2007 requirement, but their actual
supplies were 3 and 6 percent respectively.
Nevada Power met its requirement by pur-
chasing 1.02 million kwh from Sierra Pacific,
which was unable to deliver them over their
weak interconnection.64 Both utilities are also
behind on their solar quotas. (Nevada cur-
rently has no penalties for noncompliance.)
The Pew report notes the two utilities’ finan-
cial difficulties, but claims that new project
proposals and applications have left officials
“increasingly sanguine” about future RPS
compliance.65
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania’s “Alternative Energy Port-
folio Standard” sets up a two-tier requirement.
The first includes commonly recognized non-
hydro renewables andhas a solar set-aside.The
second includes incinerated trash and waste
coal, although environmentalists view the lat-
ter with some alarm. The tiers are to produce
8 and 10 percent of Pennsylvania’s power in
2021. A utility only falls under the standard
after recovering transition costs that it
incurred in the state’s restructuring program.
Three utilities became subject to RPS on Feb.
28, 2007, and the others will join them at vari-
ous dates up to Jan. 1, 2011.66 As of this writ-
ing there are no publicly available data on
compliance.67
Colorado
The Pew report discusses Colorado for
only one discernible reason: aNovember 2004
referendum there authorized a 10 percent
RPS by 2015. A 2007 law raised this to 20 per-
cent by 2020, with a 4 percent solar set-aside.
Municipal utilities and rural co-operatives are
subject to lower requirements. Compliance
data are currently unavailable, and some rules
are still being made. Pew’s author apparently
mentions Colorado because it shows that ref-
erenda are potential alternatives to regula-
tion.68
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RPS in California:
A Cautionary Tale
The 2006 Pew report finds only one of its
five representative states in compliance with
its own RPS, and the value of renewables to
that state’s system is far less than their nom-
inal capacity might suggest. Two of the five
states examined by Pew were out of compli-
ance as soon as their requirement became
binding. A fourth uses a controversial defini-
tion of renewables and has no available com-
pliance data. The last does not have all of its
rules in place to implement its program.
Pew, however, chose not to examine Califor-
nia.That’sunfortunate,becauseCaliforniamay
provide the best forecast of what will happen
under a federal RPS.
The History of RPS in California
The double-digit RPS first took root in
California in 2002, an almost natural exten-
sion of the integrated resource planning that
was reinstated after California’s failed attempt
at designing power markets. It originally
required each of the state’s three large corpo-
rate utilities to increase renewable purchases
by at least 1 percent a year to reach 20 percent
by 2017. A 2005 law advanced the 20 percent
deadline to 2010 and set an additional goal of
33 percent by 2020.
The return of integrated resource plan-
ning has made RPS compliance an integral
and politicized part of utility procurement
reviews. The law defines compliance as actu-
al operation of the renewable facility, but all
sides are stepping back from any literal use of
that definition for reasons made clear in
Figure 7.69
Even with mandates and subsidization,
renewables have failed to take off in Califor-
nia—or even to keep up with load growth.70 In
1998 10.7 percent of the utilities’ power came
from renewables, a figure that had only grown
to 11 percentwhen theRPS became effective in
2002. In May 2003, the California Public
Utilities Commission (CPUC) estimated that
reaching 20 percent by 2010 would require
4,200MWof new renewables by then. Between
2003 and January 2007, however, only 242MW
of new renewables went on-line.71 By 2007
renewable power had fallen to 10.7 percent of
utilities’ supplies, the same fraction as in 1998.
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Figure 7
Actual California Renewable Power Production vs. RPS
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2007 saw the addition of only 114MW renew-
able capacity, 85 MW of it located in Oregon.
The CPUC estimates that only 140 MW will
actually begin operation in 2008.72 The many
reasons for this poor performance included sit-
ing difficulties, delays in the planning process,
contracting problems, and uncertainty about
future regulation, including the state’s green-
house gas reduction program. All of these
would also be present under a federal RPS,
which will need provisions to determine which
reasons for failure or delay are the utility’s
responsibility andwhich are not.
Compliance in Theory and Practice
It is difficult to envision a federal rule that
would not produce disputes over compliance
like those taking place in California. Its utilities
claim tobe in compliancebecause, as ofAugust
2007, theyhadsignedcontractswithdevelopers
for 4,805 MW.73 Projects that account for over
half of that total, however, have yet to even
begin the environmental review process neces-
sary to begin construction. Another important
percentage of the renewable energy generating
capacity to-come is scheduled to be built in
areas that cannot currently be reachedby trans-
mission lines.
Usingcontracts tomeasurecomplianceputs
all megawatts on an equal footing despite the
fact that someuse established technologies and
others are highly speculative. The latter include
SouthernCaliforniaEdison’s500MW“Stirling
engine” solar array whose footprint will cover 7
square miles, with an option to expand to 850
MW. San Diego Gas & Electric has contracted
with the same developer for 300 MW, expansi-
ble to 950.74 If all are built, they will cover 25
square miles. The developer’s largest installa-
tions to date produce 150 kilowatts, but San
Diego chose not to require even a 1 MW pilot
project.75 These projects alone render over a
third of claimed compliance capacity specula-
tive at best.76
Wind and solar power account for nearly all
of the remaining contracts, but transmission
to some sites does not yet exist. The California
Energy Commission (CEC) estimates a cost of
$1.2 billion for transmission necessary to carry
all of the claimed 2010 compliance capacity.77
Even if contracts are validmeasures of compli-
ance, a 2006CEC study estimates that 20 to 30
percent of themwill fail.78
Wind units make up a substantial portion
of the claimed compliance total, but nearly
half of themwill be unable to contribute pow-
er to the system (even when the wind is blow-
ing) unless additional transmission is built,
which requires time-consuming determina-
tions of necessity and environmental compli-
ance. Adding together renewable capacity
installed between 2002 and 2007, approved
but non-operational capacity, and proposed
capacity, as of January 2008only 1664of 6,359
MW (26.1 percent) would be dispatchable bio-
mass, geothermal and small hydro facilities.
The state’s future reliance on intermittent
renewables will be even greater. Of approved
new capacity, 1,956 of 2,298 MW (85.1 per-
cent) are nondispatchable wind or solar.79
Regulating Procurement
The California utilities’ remarkable lack of
compliance in part reflects planning and pro-
curement requirements also enacted after the
state’s failed restructuring. The complex pro-
cess of evaluating a renewable generation
opportunity begins with a “market price refer-
ent” that compares the 10-year levelized cost of
therenewablewiththatofanewgas-firedplant.
The MPR is a ceiling on what the utility must
pay for the power. Assuming the renewable’s
cost is lowenoughtoallow itsprocurementbut
above the MPR, the state gives the utility or
developer a “Supplemental Energy Payment”
equal to the difference. The funds come from
banked “Public Goods Surcharges” previously
paid by consumers as 3percent premia on their
bills. The CPUC is concerned that the increas-
ing costs of renewables, particularly wind, will
soon exhaust funds available for SEPs.80
The byzantine rules require that the utili-
ty use a “least-cost best-fit” (LCBF) procedure
to determine compatibility of the renewable
with its existing resource mix. Next, it sub-
mits a “transmission ranking cost report”
(TRCR) to evaluate the plant’s impact on the
grid. Each utility has its own LCBF proce-
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dure, which the CEC says “suffers consider-
able murkiness and requires a high degree of
interpretation and judgment.”81
Sinceutilities are entitled to collect both the
MPR (which they themselves determine) and
any Supplemental Energy Payments, they have
few incentives to monitor costs. Recognizing
this, the CPUC has appointed a Procurement
Review Group (PRG) for each utility, whose
members have no commercial interest in
renewables.82 Thus far, PRGs have had few dif-
ferences with utilities.
The EnergyCommission has noted that the
details of applying MPR, LCBF, and TRCR are
“known only to utilities and individuals partic-
ipating in [PRGs]” under non-disclosure agree-
ments. The limits on information flowmake it
“impossible for policy makers to determine
whether [theutilities] are selectingprojects that
are truly least-cost and best aligned with the
state’s policy to provide long-term benefits to
the system.”83 Utilities claim that their compet-
itive situationswarrant ahighdegree of secrecy,
since otherwise potential generation suppliers
could exercise market power. In 2006 a court
denied the utilities’ request that the individual
Energy Commissioners be personally required
to sign confidentiality agreements.84
Cost Caps, Penalties, and Strategies
California penalizes RPS shortfalls at a
seemingly punitive 5 cents per kWh, but only
up to $25 million per year. These threats are
hardly credible, since Southern California
Edison and Pacific Gas&Electric have annual
sales over $9 billion. Even these low penalties
are not certainties.85 If a utility’s approved
renewables cost more than the MPR and sup-
plementary payment funds are exhausted, it is
exempt and pays nothing. An RPS that carries
meaningless penalties canonly encourageutil-
ities to act strategically, an incentive com-
pounded by the underlying politics.
RPS follows a common pattern in envi-
ronmental legislation. A legislature reacts to
a perceived problem with an ambitious law
and a short implementation timetable, leav-
ing the details of rulemaking and enforce-
ment to regulatory agencies. Noncompliance
only becomes evident with the passage of
time, and carries few adverse political conse-
quences. The original legislators and regula-
tors have moved on, leaving their successors
to enact reforms and apportion blame.
California’s RPS has followed this rather
cynical narrative. Legislators lost interest soon
after its enactment, and stringent term limits
ensure their quick departures. Almost from
the outset, regulators have understood that
utilities will not meet the RPS, but the law’s
pricing and penalty provisions make mean-
ingful enforcement impossible. Accordingly, it
is understandablewhy theCPUCsupports the
utilities’ contract-based claims of compliance
in its reports to the legislature. Its January
2007 report opens by stating that utilities are
“closing in on the 20 percent target with four
years of procurement ahead.”86 It mentions in
passing the law’s definition of compliance as
actual operation, but all graphics and data
refer to signed contracts. The report further
assumes that all new contracts will succeed
and all expiring ones renewed or reformulat-
ed.87 Its latest (April 2008) report provides no
detailed numerical data on either compliance
amounts or contracts.88
California’s utilities have little to lose from
noncompliance. Instead, they may be using
RPS as a strategic tool to vertically reintegrate
themselves. In the state’s 1996 restructuring
PacificGas&Electric andSouthernCalifornia
Edisondivested their in-state fossil-fueledgen-
erators to non-utility producers.89 Today,
scarcity prevails. Most of the promised renew-
ables exist only on paper, and fossil plant con-
struction has lagged because of uncertainty
about futuremarket rules and regulatory poli-
cies. As of September 2007, 2,278 fossil-fueled
MW were being built, 1,200 of which will not
be operating before mid-2009.90 These
amounts are insufficient to cover average
annual load growth. Even if more renewables
were in process, much necessary transmission
would remain unbuilt and, in some cases, still
unsited. Even demand management is falling
short of its goals.91 California is short on both
production and conservation, its abilities to
adjust constrained by its own regulations.
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For utilities the lack of resourcesmay be an
opportunity. In mid-2006 the CPUC ordered
Southern California Edison to install 250MW
of quick-start gas turbines and implement 300
MWof demand response in order tominimize
the likelihood of blackouts in summer 2007.92
Noting time constraints, the order exempted
SCE from procurement and planning regula-
tions requiring the examination of alternatives
and competitive bidding. In July 2007, the
Arizona Corporation Commission voted not
to approve a line that would be an important
conduit for future supplies to California.
Shortly afterward, SCE told the CPUC that its
absence would require the company to obtain
1,380MWof new generation.93 SanDiegoGas
& Electric has long sought CPUC approval of
its Sunrise Powerlink transmission project,
claiming it is necessary to reach renewables it
requires for RPS compliance. Critics claim that
the transmission lines will primarily move
energy into the southwest fromplants inMexi-
co owned by SDG&E’s parent company.94
National RPS Costs
and Benefits
Renewable energy is more costly to pro-
duce than conventional energy. Nevertheless,
most of the 18 studies of a national RPS that
appeared between 1997 and 2007 found that
it would have little effect on electricity
prices.95 Using a complex computer model,
several have concluded that a national RPS
passes a cost/benefit test.
As in all such analyses, the results are large-
ly implicit in the assumptions. Engineering
models in common use can produce accurate
estimate of how (e.g.) a fuel price increase will
affect power prices and system operations.
These models, however, start from present-
day facts to derive present-day conclusions.
Assumptions about the future are harder to
devise and work with. There are many plausi-
ble choices, and their predicted effects will
depend on details of themodel that are them-
selves largely assumptions.
For example, expectations about future fuel
prices will determine investments in both con-
ventional and renewable generation as well as
power prices. Changes in the demand for pow-
er will depend on relatively predictable demo-
graphics and unpredictable changes in genera-
tion technologies and conservation options
that themselves affect prices. New metering
technologies and ratedesigns canbetter inform
users about the cost of the power they are con-
suming and induce shifts in their timepatterns
of consumption. Unpredictable changes in law,
regulations and market institutions will affect
all aspects of production and consumption,
and anationalRPS is but one ofmanypossibil-
ities.
NEMS
One computer model dominates RPS re-
search. The U.S. Energy Information Admini-
stration’s National Energy Modeling System is
the source of forecasts in EIA’s Annual Energy
Outlook, and is freely available to other re-
searchers. NEMS is a complex computer pack-
age that consists of 13 “modules” that together
estimate and forecast hundreds of variables.96
They include prices and outputs of energy com-
modities (including importedoil), consumption
by varioususers (residential, industrial, etc.), and
macroeconomicvariables suchasGDP.NEMS’s
forecasts depend on literally thousands of
assumptions, some chosen by users and others
hidden in themodel’smathematical structure.97
NEMS’s detail and complexity effectively ex-
clude non-specialists from using it and evaluat-
ing the quality of its results.
NEMSdominates this forecasting “market”
despite its remarkably poor performance,
which has improved little if at all since its 1994
introduction.98 The farther in the future, the
poorer the correspondence between forecasted
andactual outcomes.NEMSappears topredict
some important variableswell, but the seeming
precision conceals poor forecasts of their com-
ponents.99 One can always hope that a superior
model will come along, but NEMS differs little
from many other long-range forecasting mod-
els that have consistently failed.100 Futures con-
tracts predict gas prices more accurately than
NEMS’s gasmarketmodule.101
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Forecasts based on NEMS depend heavily
on assumptions about technological change.
A 2007 EIA study for the U.S. Senate of a 15
percent RPS for 2030 illustrates the impor-
tance of those assumptions. Simple extension
of existing trends (see Figures 2 and 3) would
predict a continuing increase in wind power
and little change in biomass generation.
NEMS, however, projected a 400 percent rise
in wind generation and a 700 percent increase
in biomass, leavingwind energy to produce 16
and 68 percent of renewable power in 2030.102
The reversal appears to stem from assump-
tions about future technology for which EIA
provides little rationale.103 Other potentially
helpful information cannot be input into
NEMS. For example, EIA compilations of pro-
posedgeneration currently showthousandsof
megawatts of wind capacity and very small
amounts of biomass.104
Business-as-Usual Scenarios
Areasonablestartingpoint is toaskwhatwill
happen if current policies and expected trends
continue. This “business-as-usual” scenario
yields some unexpected outcomes.105 Under
BAU, gas-fired and nuclear generation will
change littleover thenext20yearsandcoal-fired
power will meet most demand growth.106 Non-
hydroelectric renewables will produce only 3.6
percentof the2030total,up fromslightlyover2
percent in 2006. The share of fossil fuels will
remain approximately unchanged.107 Only
extreme changes in assumptions lead to a pre-
diction of over 4 percent renewable power in
2030. Even if all RPS states are in compliance
with their programs, renewables will produce
only 29 percent more power than under BAU
andwill still be under 5 percent of the total.108
One finding common to most NEMS
studies is that a national RPS will increase
power prices by relatively little, generally
under 5 percent. That figure is the net effect
of higher cost renewables and lower gas
prices as they replace gas-fired plants.109 Yet
those calculations have problems. Nearly all
of these studies have underestimated both
the cost of renewables and the increase in gas
prices. Some studies neglect costs of integrat-
ing renewables into the grid, and nearly all
assume that the federal production tax cred-
it on wind energy will be permanent.
For those who trust it, NEMS can analyze
numerous proposed policies. Generalizing
again, it usually predicts that any policy that
doesnot compel investment in renewableswill
have little impact on the percentage of power
they supply. For example, EIA used NEMS to
analyze recommendations by the National
Commission on Energy Policy for a $6/ton
greenhouse emissions charge that rises to
$8.50 in 2025, accompanied by a $4 billion
production tax credit for new non-emitting
generation from 2006 to 2009.110 Even these
seemingly large incentives raise renewables’
share of 2025 generation by under 1 per-
cent.111 Evaluating another policy proposal,
researchers at Resources for the Future used
their own model (considerably simpler than
NEMS) to determine that a national RPS was
superior to an equivalent value production tax
credit both for cutting emissionsand inducing
investment in renewables.112
Emissions and Gas Prices
NEMSandothermodels agree that anRPS
will reduce carbon emissions by less than the
RPS percentage. A 10 percent increase in gen-
eration by renewables cuts them by approxi-
mately 6 percent.113 This occurs for two rea-
sons. First, intermittent renewables run in lieu
of quickly adjustable gas-fired units rather
than coal-firedplantswhose output cannot be
adjusted quickly. The former emit smaller vol-
umes of greenhouse gases than the latter per
kWh produced. Second, when nondispatch-
able renewables rise to 20 percent of capacity,
they begin to replace nuclear rather than fos-
sil-fueled generators.114
NEMS-basedRPS studies almost uniformly
predict lower gas prices as renewables displace
gas-fired generation.115 Some predict a large
enough decline that the RPS brings a “free
lunch”ofenvironmentalbenefits atnonetcost,
but their claim is economically illogical because
it fails to account for the wealth lost by those
who produce gas (workers, capitalists, equip-
ment makers, etc.). A buyer who saves a dollar
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on gas can buy the same quantity as before and
still have it to spend elsewhere. That unspent
dollar, however, is lost to those who produce
gas. The net effect is a transfer rather than an
increase in the nation’s wealth.116
Moreover, any fall in gas prices will be
short-lived since in any competitive market,
the highest-cost producer just breaks even. If
an RPS causes price to fall, some formerly
viable producers will take losses. As they leave
the market, less is produced, price rises, and
benefits to gas consumers fall.
The Dominance of Wind Energy
As shown in Figure 3, wind is the only
renewable whose output has increased signifi-
cantly since 1990. An indexed production tax
credit (PTC), currently 1.9 cents per kwh, first
became law in 1992, and investment began its
upward trend in 1998. The PTC has expired
andbeen temporarily extended four times, and
investment has dropped drastically with each
expiration.117 The Energy Policy Act of 2005
extended the PTC to certain other renewables,
but investment in themhas yet to respond.
Wind energy has some advantages over oth-
er forms of renewable energy. Wind, for
instance, is the least site-specific renewable, and
many large consuming areas are within easy
transmission range of windy ones.118 Wind
units often encounter less local resistance than
fossil plants andother renewables, and they can
be grouped into large “farms.”
Two obstacles, however, stand in the way of
futurewind investments. First, localizedhostil-
ity is growing as units grow in size, visibility
(some over 400 feet high) and audibility.
Second, wind’s costs have greatly increased in
recent years.Costsper installedkilowatt steadi-
ly declined from the 1980s through the early
2000s. They then rose by 60 percent per
installed kilowatt between 2003 and 2006, and
18 percent between 2005 and 2006 alone. The
most important part of the increase was an
increase in turbine costs, which is expected to
continue over the near future.119
Many national RPS scenarios predict that
the preponderance of compliance investments
will be wind. Operating experience has con-
firmed that the costs of adding small amounts
of intermittent renewables to an existing grid
are low. Random fluctuations in wind require
the same type of response as fluctuations in
load or minor generator outages.
It is also generally agreed that if wind or
other intermittent sources come to exceed 15
to 20 percent of capacity, they begin to impose
higher operating costs.120 Wind unit outages
(non-production of power) will probably be
more highly correlated than outages of con-
ventional plants, i.e. if it is calmatone location
in a control area it is also relatively likely to
also be calm at others.121 The magnitude of
those costs in a particular system depends on
its generation mix, interconnections, trans-
mission grid, and weather.
The most complete U.S. study to date
examined the cost to a utility (4,600MWpeak
load) ofmaintaining industry operating stan-
dards with alternative amounts of wind
capacity.122 Assume that a wind unit will be
paid the marginal cost per kwh of conven-
tional generation it replaces, net of payments
to the system operator for balancing and
load-following services. If there is only a small
amountofwind capacity the system incurs no
extraordinary cost and it receives an average
of $30 per MWh over the year. Raising wind
capacity to 1,000 MW (about 20 percent of
system capacity) lowers its net payment per
MWh to $15, and raising it to 2,000 MW
drops it to $8. If most investments tomeet an
RPS are wind, they will not be viable if they
must bear the actual operating costs they
impose on the grid.
Wind’s usefulness to a grid operator is low-
eredby thegeneral inverse associationbetween
peak loads and wind velocities. In most
regions, on-peak velocities are also lower in
summer than winter. At the five highest load
hours of 2006, wind units in California pro-
duced an average of 12.2 percent of nominal
capacities.123 Average California wind genera-
tionduringon-peakhours (7AMto10PM) in
July 2006 was 495 MW (21 percent of capaci-
ty) and 464 MW in August.124 Similarly, the
average output of Texas 2,800 MW of wind
generators is 16.8 percent of capacity, most of
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which occurs off-peak. For system planning
purposes, its grid operator set awind turbine’s
“effective capacity” at 10 percent of its nomi-
nal amount, a figure later downgraded to 8.7
percent.125
Advocates of a national RPS also have yet to
estimate the cost of new transmission required
to reach isolated wind generators. Some local
data, however, are emerging. Depending on
their exact locations, the 10,000MWof renew-
ables (nearly all wind) for Texas’s 2025RPSwill
require between $1.7 and $3.0 billion in new
transmission.126 To meet its 33 percent 2020
standard,Californiamustconstruct$5.7billion
of new 500 and 230 kv lines alone (the two
highest generally used voltages). It will also
require lower voltage lines, $655million of new
transformers, and1,800MVARof reactivepow-
er.127 For comparison, in 2005 transmission
spendingbyU.S. corporateutilitieswas$5.8bil-
lion, including upgrades and replacements of
depreciated facilities.128
The intermittent availability of wind pow-
ermeans that transmission of that power will
generally cost more than lines that carry con-
ventional power. A radial line to an isolated
wind unit will only be loaded to capacity dur-
ing the relatively few hours when winds are
strongest. Unlike lines embedded in a dense
network, transmission to a distant power
plant can increase risks to reliability. Losing a
line in a dense network is often aminor prob-
lem because power can take many alternative
paths. Losing a line to an isolated generator
means that its power cannot be delivered and
more reserves may be required to maintain
reliability.
Renewables andMarkets
Over the past 20 years, markets for “whole-
sale” power have grown in scope and competi-
tiveness. Instead of relying only on generation
that they own, to varying degrees utilities
everywhere cannowobtainpowerby contracts
with other generation owners (including non-
utilities and industrial cogenerators). Utilities
can also often use regional energy markets in
which day-ahead and hourly prices equate
supply and demand.
The case for competitive contracting and
markets in electricity is the same as else-
where—competition motivates the efficient
use of resources, the efficient planning of
investments for the future, and rewards inno-
vation. Electricity markets, however, are con-
strained by operating considerations. The
production of power in an interconnected
grid must equal its load at all times. Since a
mismatch (in either direction) lasting only a
single second can bring regional blackouts,
the operatormust have reserves available that
can be brought on line quickly, and have
units operating that can follow second-by-
second changes in load.
Further, transmission constraints in elec-
tricity differ in important ways from those in
other networks. Unlike water or gas, power
flows along individual AC lines follow physi-
cal laws and cannot be directly controlled by
the system operator. Instead the operator
(often a computer algorithm) must some-
times operate high cost generators in partic-
ular locations in order to maintain regional
balance and neither overload nor destabilize
(underload) individual lines.
These technological requirements mean
that the scopeofpowermarkets and thebehav-
ior of their participantsmust be constrained to
maintain reliability. If there are no transmis-
sion constraints and generatorsmay be started
and stopped on a moment’s notice, the least-
cost production mix will ensure that those
units with the lowest marginal costs will oper-
ate before those with higher costs, a phenome-
non known in the field as “dispatch by merit
order.” A single utility that owned and operat-
ed all of the generation in a control area would
dispatch by merit order, and a competitive
market where generators bid in their power at
marginal cost would behave similarly. Security
constraints, however, mean that strict merit
order dispatch is impossible in both cases.
Dispatch is also complicated by different
“ramp rates” at which the outputs of different
types of generators can be changed. Nuclear
and coal units have low operating costs, but
their output cannot be altered quickly enough
to match unexpected changes in load. Gas-
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fired units have higher operating costs, but the
need to “follow” unexpected load changes will
mean that some must operate even if lower
marginal cost coal units are available. Hydro-
electric power burns no fuel and renews itself
with the seasons, but it does have a marginal
opportunity cost—usingpart of a limited reser-
voir atonedatemeans that lesswill be available
on others when it might be more valuable. In
practice, hydro in the west is valuable for
“shaping” power over the day to minimize the
costs of bringing gas-fired units up to meet
peaks and turning themdown as demand falls
in the evening.
Whether the system is centrally dispatched
ormarket-based, a renewable—like hydro—can
improve reliability and reduce operating costs.
Renewables like biomass and geothermal may
be base-loaded and integrated into either a
market or a centralized system like conven-
tional plants. Intermittent renewables, as we
have seen, can bring operating problems to
centralized systems if they are a large enough
component of resources. They also, however,
can constrain the use of markets.
The simple fact that wind units have a
seemingmarginal cost of zero (and that their
output is not storable) does not unambigu-
ously imply that they are beneficial.129 As not-
ed above, for efficient operation, the net
income to the producer of a wind-generated
energymust equal the difference between the
cost of the power it replaces and the increased
costs of maintaining reliability that its inter-
mittency imposes. As also noted above, this
figure can becomenegativewhenwind looms
large enough, meaning that the system’s
avoidable costs would be minimized if the
units were disconnected. In the absence of
some method for assessing the wind’s actual
contribution in real time, wind units will
always bid into the market (at a zero price)
while operating costs are higher than other-
wise. The ancillary services will be priced at
their scarcity value, but if wind is not, market
prices will induce overinvestment in wind
and require that more, rather than less, fuel
be burned. Adding a production tax credit
increases the distortion.
Cost and Benefit Calculations
Thus far our discussionhas been almost all
about the potential costs of a national RPS. If
we accept the outcomes ofmodels likeNEMS,
we can expect that a national RPS will have a
relatively minor effect on power costs. The
effect on gas prices is a pure transfer frompro-
ducers to consumers. If intermittent renew-
ables impose operating costs that are not
borne by their owners, those costs will be
“socialized” into higher bills and there will be
incentives to invest in them beyond economi-
cally efficient levels. In effect, part of the return
to renewables investors comes from an ability
to shift those costs onto others, including
those of the production tax credit. If there are
transmission requirements for renewables
beyond those associated with conventional
resources that produce equivalent amounts of
reliable power, the difference is also a cost. In
summary, under most plausible assumptions
about fuel prices and technological develop-
ment, only a very small amount of investment
in renewableswill pass amarket test andprove
competitive with conventional generation.
If all of the costs and benefits of renewable
fuels were priced in energy markets, that
would be the end of the story: An RPS would
be a straightforward special-interest policy
and on net economically inefficient. But com-
parisons like these are not the entire story. A
generationmix heavier with renewablesmight
also produce social benefits that more than
outweigh these costs.
There aremany possible types of such ben-
efits that have been brought forth by advo-
cates as possible reasons for encouraging
investment in renewables that do not pass
market tests by themselves. An examinationof
those arguments follows.130
The Environmental Case
for Renewable Energy
The environmental case for a national RPS
is foundeduponatheoryknowntosomeecon-
omists as “market failure.” Roughly speaking,
market failures occur when the costs (or bene-
23
A design
standard such as
an RPSmay be
inefficient
because it
forecloses any
possibility that
other policies can
do the same job
at a smaller cost.
3575_PA627_1stClass:3575_PA627_1stClass  10/30/2008  7:09 AM  Page 23
fits) of some activity to society are greater (or
less) than those experienced by the personwho
decides on that activity. If everyone paid their
share of the benefits derived from the use of
environmentally benign power (or for appli-
ances designed to save electricity), the value of
the cleaner environment (alongwith thepower
itself) could eclipse that of higher electricity
bills. If negotiations among people to volun-
tarilypay for this environmentalbenefit are too
costly (as they probably are), the theory ofmar-
ket failure often recommends such interven-
tions as corrective taxes or subsidies.131 All this,
of course, presupposes that governmentwould
faithfully carry out economists’ recommenda-
tionswithoutbringingpolitics into thepicture.
Our earlier discussion of intermittent re-
sources illustrates these points. Disregarding
possible environmental benefits for the mo-
ment, an investor considering a wind generator
compares itsexpecteddiscountedfuturerevenue
(at market or contract prices) with the cost of
building it. If owners of wind units do not bear
the cost of standby capacity, they will overinvest
in it. They will build plants that they would not
build if required to bear all of the costs associat-
edwith theirdecisions.Here the“market failure”
is not a fault of anymarket, but rather the effect
of a regulatory choice not to charge investors in
windunits the full cost of their actions.
Next let’s assume that no special provi-
sions are needed regarding the wind genera-
tor’s intermittency, but that operating it
eliminates emissions from fossil generation
that harm health. Now too few renewables
will be built because investors receive only the
price of power as payment and do not cap-
ture any of the benefits of cleaner air.
Estimating the true net benefits of wind
generation thus requires two adjustments.
We must add the value of cleaner air to that
of the power it produces, and add the cost of
standby capacity to the cost directly incurred
by the builder. In subsequent sections we will
encounter other rationales for a national
RPS. In terms of their policy relevance, how-
ever, by far themost important are those that
treat an RPS as environmental policy.
Market failureshave longbeenused to illus-
trate and rationalize pollution control policies
suchas taxes and subsidies, but the first topro-
pose RPS on those grounds were economist
Richard Norgaard of the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley andNancy Rader, an attorney for
wind producers.132 Norgaard and Rader also
favored anRPSas a response tomarket failures
that had led to dependence on foreign energy
(discussed below) and an unsustainable envi-
ronment.
More strongly than other RPS advocates,
Norgaard and Rader view renewables as nec-
essary for the attainment of long-term envi-
ronmental sustainability. They find pollu-
tion taxes and tradable emission permits
desirable but insufficient because they donot
directly spur the development of renewables.
Absent an RPS, pollution will fall but power
production will continue to exploit what
Norgaard and Rader view as an unsustain-
able fossil resource base. Norgaard andRader
do not examine the implications of elites
choosing eligible resources and implementa-
tion plans.133
It is helpful to think of anRPS as a physical
design standard for power systems. Where
transactions costs are high—for instance,
when dealing with automobile tailpipe emis-
sions—a design standard such as the catalytic
converter may be efficient. In industries like
electricity, however, a design standard may be
inefficient because it forecloses any possibility
that other policies can do the same job at a
smaller cost. Even if better abatement meth-
ods are available, an inefficient standard may
persist for political reasons or because of sheer
inertia.
An RPS is one of many possible policies to
address environment-related market failures.
An alternative appears in the Clean Air Act and
subsequent amendments. It requires the U.S.
EnvironmentalProtectionagency to setquanti-
tative standards for concentrations of “criteria
pollutants” that currently include sulfuroxides,
nitrogen oxides, particulate matter, carbon
monoxide, ground-level ozone, lead, and most
recently mercury.134 EPA sets permissible levels
using health-based “primary standards” and
“secondary standards” intended to limit envi-
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ronmental and property damages, but leaves it
to states to decide how best tomeet them.135
Critics of every political stripe have found
fault with EPA’s standards for criteria pollu-
tants, the methods it uses to set them, and its
enforcement policies. Nevertheless, EPA’s
methods bear some resemblance to principles
of efficient pollution control derived from
economic theory. By comparison, a national
RPS violates virtually all of these principles.136
Environmental Economics
The first principle of efficient environmen-
tal policy is to select a standard that will maxi-
mize net benefits. The fact that a national RPS
will replace some polluting generators with
non-polluting ones says nothing about its
desirability, which depends on the benefits of
lower emissions and the costs of abating them.
However imperfectly, EPAsets its standards
by estimating the values of the lives saved by
reducing a pollutant and the costs of achiev-
ing the reduction. By contrast, no advocate of
a national RPS has ever attempted to estimate
the costs and benefits of different percentage
requirements, or to compare an RPS with
alternatives such as the retrofitting of existing
generators or policies to manage power
demand. The EPA analogue of an RPS would
be an order to replace 20 percent of all cars
with bicycles but with no attempt to estimate
the resulting drop in pollution, no determina-
tion of whether the reduction is optimal, and
no examination of alternatives that would
achieve the same benefits.137
After setting the acceptable level of a pollu-
tant on efficiency grounds, the second princi-
ple of efficient environmental policy is to
attack all emission sources. Minimizing the
total cost of a given reduction requires equat-
ing the marginal costs of abatement at every
source, whether a generator or a facility in
some other industry. A national RPS looks
only at power plants and does not examine
other sources of the pollutant. Even if there is
a particular reason to concentrate on power
plant emissions (perhaps the costs of moni-
toring such large sources are very low), replac-
ing an existing or planned conventional gener-
ator with a renewable energy generator is just
one of many ways to achieve the reduction.
The thirdprincipleof efficient environmen-
tal policy is to attack the pollutant directly
rather than regulating inputs, outputs, or the
design of the process that produces it.
Renewability is an aspect of design and build-
ing renewable energy plants will only by acci-
dent be the optimal way to achieve a given
reduction in emissions. The alternative is to set
some standard (possibly with tradable credits)
and allow potential polluters to choose their
ownwaysofmeeting those standards. In effect,
anRPS rewards investments in certain types of
generation rather than investments (including
research) in pollution control that may be
more cost-effective.
The fourth and final principle of efficient
environmental policy is to match the geo-
graphic area being regulated to the area
impacted by the pollutant. Even if an RPS is
the lowest cost means of pollution control, a
national standard is only appropriate if its
boundaries include all sources of the pollu-
tant and contain all of the damages. If pro-
duction and/or harm from a pollutant is
localized, regulation should likewise be local-
ized. If the affected area extends beyond
national boundaries (for instance, in the case
of carbon dioxide emissions), international
arrangements are called for.
The Superiority of Market-Based
Environmental Regulation
Most economistswill bequick to agree that
market-based environmental policies will be
more efficient than direct interventions such
as an RPS, and policymakers are coming to
agree with them.138 The most common mar-
ket-based institution is known as a “cap and
trade” system. Under it, polluters as a group
receive a set total of pollution allowances that
they can use to achieve current compliance,
bank for future use, or exchange among them-
selves inmarkets.
Economists have found EPA’s SO2 and
NOx cap-and trade programs to be efficient
methods for achieving compliance with its
standards.139 Additional markets are being
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planned to for operation under the recently
issued Clean Air Interstate and Clean Air
Mercury rules (CAIR and CAIM).140
Allowance markets efficiently reduce emis-
sions for thesamereasons thatmarkets formore
ordinary goods and services generally outper-
form“command-and-control” regimes.Markets
economize on the information required to
achieve efficient allocations because they facili-
tate decentralized trading.Rather thana central-
ized information processing authority, markets
take knowledge that is dispersed among buyers
andsellersandallowthemtotradeas theysee fit.
When they do, prices emerge as indicators of
scarcity, signaling people to redirect their activi-
tiesandadjust theirbehavior.141Even if individu-
als trusted government with personal informa-
tion, only by a rare accident would its agents
manage to collect and process all of the data
required todetermine an efficient outcome.
In a competitive market, price equals the
marginal (incremental production) cost of the
highest-cost seller and the marginal valuation
(willingness to pay) of the last buyer whose
offer is accepted. In a competitive market for
allowances, generatorshave incentives to create
transactions that minimize the cost of achiev-
ing a given reduction in emissions. Generators
who can cheaply reduce their own pollution
will do it so that they can sell allowances to
thosewhocanonly reduce theirs athigher cost.
Some generators with extremely high costs of
controlling their emissions will find it worth-
while to reduce output or close down and sell
their allowances.
A national RPS may reduce emissions of
some pollutant, but only by accident will a
renewable energy facility built in response to
it be the efficient instrument to achieve that
reduction. An RPS gives renewables priority
simply because they are renewables rather
than because they are efficient ways to miti-
gate pollution. If pollution allowances are
tradable, the power plants to be built will be
those with the lowest totals of annualized
operating, capital and allowance costs. These
need not be renewables.
Looking forward, an RPS could even be an
obstacle to theadoptionof superiorgeneration
and abatement technologies. Because an RPS
prespecifies admissible types of resources, it
mayadaptpoorly to innovations.Thechoiceof
qualifying renewables appears to be as much
political as it is scientific. Defining a new tech-
nology as renewable can reduce the returns to
owners of already existing ones. Some renew-
ables benefit from policies like the federal
Production Tax Credit, and their owners will
resist its extension to potentially superior
plants.142 By contrast, a cap-and-trade system
does not pre-specify or prohibit any technolo-
gies. Instead, like other markets, it rewards
developers of technologies or operating prac-
tices that promise greater efficiency.
An RPS must also be evaluated in the con-
text of existing environmental regulations that
it will supplement (or possibly replace). Pollut-
ants that are under cap-and-trade regimes may
be particularly affected. If renewables reduce
emissionsof a cappedpollutant, ownersof con-
ventional plants that remain in operation will
be able to increase theirs. Allowance prices will
fall and conventional plant owners will not
need to make investments to further cut their
emissions. Emissionswill remain at the cap lev-
el, but the reduction due to the renewables
could have been achieved more cheaply by the
conventional generators.143
AnRPSwill also probably engender ineffi-
ciency in the control of emissions that are
already regulated under design standards. If
renewables further reduce the emission of
pollutants regulated under those regimes,
there will be inefficient overcompliance. A
design standard implies an emission target
that environmental regulators implicitly view
as optimal, whether or not the amount is
explicitly stated. Restoring efficiency may
require that conventional plants be allowed
to increase their emissions, or that new ones
be built to less stringent standards.
Renewables and Global Warming
A national RPS will be a poor instrument
for the control of criteria pollutants and a sim-
ilarly poor one for the control of greenhouse
gases (GHG).144 Renewables are but one of
many ways to displace GHG emissions, and
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only by coincidence will the conventional gen-
erators they replace be the sources that are
cheapest to reduce. As noted above, if most
renewables produce intermittently, they will
primarily replace relatively benign gas-fired
units. If some nonelectrical GHG source is
cheaper to reduce, the job canbe accomplished
for less by spending to reduce it instead of
building renewables.
Even if the source that matters is conven-
tional generation, there are numerous tech-
nologies thatmay be cheaper than renewables
to achieve a given reduction in the GHGs that
it produces. Aswith criteria pollutants, anRPS
can only reduce the efficiency of GHG control
because it imposes another constraint on the
efficient solution of an already complex prob-
lem and brings no new opportunities. An RPS
that requires investment in certain renewables
will almost certainly produce an inferior solu-
tion because those renewables will be less effi-
cient at GHG control than non-renewables
likehydroelectric andnuclearpower, and (pos-
sibly) carbon sequestration.145 RPS advocates’
general refusal to consider expanding the first
two is as much political as it is scientific.
Arguments that RPS is a “second best” solu-
tion because carbon is unpriced will vanish as
carbon pricing (or possibly taxation) and trad-
ing of allowances comes of age.
Geography further ensures that a national
RPS ismore a gesture of concern than a useful
instrument for GHG control. If carbon emis-
sions from any source diffuse through the
entire atmosphere, an RPS in a single nation
will have negligible benefits and potentially
high costs to its residents.
The gesture becomes even more futile in
smaller jurisdictions such as California where
“leakages” are likely. Ina typical year,California
utilities import 20 percent or more of their
power from other western states, mostly at
peaks when in-state generation is expensive. If
northwest hydropower is unavailable or trans-
mission is constrained, they buy relatively
cheap coal-fired power from generators in the
southwest. California’s emerging GHG stan-
dardswill require that anycoal-firedpurchases,
save in emergencies, come from plants that
emit nomore carbon dioxide than a new com-
bined cycle gas turbine generator. Since these
coal technologies do not yet exist, Californians
will be forced to import more expensive gas-
firedpower. Insteadofa reduction inGHGs, all
that will happen is a reshuffling of contracts
andno change in the generationmix that actu-
ally operates. Utilities in other states will pur-
chase the coal-fired power on more attractive
terms, while Californians pay more for power
from sources that their state regulators ap-
prove of. As regards imported power, the out-
comewill be as if California had never institut-
ed its GHGprogram.146
Asof thiswriting, there isonlyonepublished
analysis thatcompares thecostsofusinganRPS
to reduce CO2 emissions with those of alterna-
tives.147 Dobesova et al. examined wind invest-
ments used to satisfy Texas’s RPS requirement
in 2002. They considered direct costs, produc-
tion taxcredits, anda rangeof indirect costs and
benefits including transmission investments,
fuel and allowance savings at displaced plants,
and increased integration costs due to intermit-
tency.Thealternative examinedwas an integrat-
ed coal gasification generator with carbon
sequestration. The cost of CO2 removal using
windplants (which produce none)was approxi-
mately 5.7 cents per kWh. Using a consensus of
projections for the coal technology, they esti-
mated its incremental removal costs at between
0.8 and 2.4 cents per kWh. The cost per metric
ton of CO2 avoided is $58.70 for a combined-
cyclegas-firedplant,$51.20forapulverizedcoal-
fired one, and $29.50 for coal gasification, all
withsequestration.Onlyatacarbonpriceof$56
or more per ton would the wind generator
(without a tax credit) be competitive with an
older coal-fired plant using sequestration tech-
nology. Even under favorable assumptions,
wind generationwill often be uneconomic.
Macroeconomic Rationales
for an RPS
Some advocates claim that a national RPS
will bring macroeconomic benefits, similar to
those of a job-creating fiscal policy. That
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might happen in an extreme depression like
that of the 1930s, withmasses ofwillingwork-
ers unemployed because aggregate demand is
deficient. If jobs open up in the renewables
industry, some of these workers would take
them at a negligible cost to society because
their only alternative is unemployment.
Today’s economy in no way resembles
that one. Any compulsory investment in
renewables simply takes funds from people
and businesses that would have spent them
on other goods. Job gains in the renewable
energy sector will be offset by job losses in the
industries that produce those other goods.
One typical job creation study published by
theRenewable andAppropriate Energy Labora-
tory (RAEL) at the University of California,
Berkeley tabulates estimates of the employment
stimulus of an RPS, using figures from an
unpublisheddocumentbya teamof renewables
advocates. That document summarizes 13 oth-
er studies and concludes that “the renewable
energy sector generatesmore jobs permegawatt
of power installed, per unit of energy produced,
and per dollar of investment than the fossil fuel
based energy sector.”148
The RAEL analysis rests in part on a solar
photovoltaic facility that produces 20 percent
of the energy it is theoretically capable of pro-
ducing under perfect conditions.149 Disregard-
ing the existence of night, its authors find that
a coal-equivalent megawatt of solar power
requires four megawatts of solar capacity.
Building them requires four times the labor
required for a coal-fired megawatt, and total
labor requirements (construction plus opera-
tion) per megawatt-hour over the solar plant’s
lifespan are 10 times those of the coal-fired
plant.150 They conclude that inefficient solar
plants are superior to efficient conventional
ones at creating employment.
Of course, in today’s economy, renewable
energy does not create jobs. Renewable ener-
gy investments waste workers who would be
more productive elsewhere absent the special
regulatory treatment of renewable energy.151
Calculations like these show little apprecia-
tion for the fluidity of actual labor mar-
kets.152 In any case, evenwith anRPS, the pro-
duction of renewables would be so small rel-
ative to total output that any impact on over-
all employment would likely be undetectable.
Rural Development
In a variant of the job creation logic, the
geographic inconvenience ofmany renewable
resources, particularly wind, has produced
claims that a national RPS can revitalize rur-
al areas that have lost population.
Rural residents have been a declining per-
centage of population since the Civil War,
although their numbers have increased since
1970.153 RPS advocates have never made clear
why those who remain are in need of help.
Between 2000 and2003, 49 ofNorthDakota’s
53 counties lost population. Nevertheless, the
state’s 2003 unemployment rate was 3.6 per-
cent, slightly over half the national figure of
6.0 percent.154 Local politicians may regret a
loss of leverage that comes with population
loss, but the population itself seems to be
making the sometimes difficult adjustments
on its own.
Some advocates view renewables as an
instrument to de-corporatize electricity sup-
ply.155 In particular, rural governments or local
groups can take amore active role as owners of
wind power installations.156 The Worldwatch
Institute apparently subscribes to the18thcen-
tury mercantilist fallacy that the purpose of
trade is to accumulate money, favoring local
ownership of rural renewables because “wealth
remains in the local community.”157 In reality,
farmers receive their incomes by selling crops
to urbanites. Rural electric cooperatives are
local nonprofit associations that own and
operate distribution networks in sparsely pop-
ulated areas, but their trade association is on
record against an RPS at any level of govern-
ment.158
Infant Industries
Another oft-heard rationale for a national
RPS is that renewable energy is an “infant
industry,” and the RPS would ensure the
industry’s viability just as a tariff ensures that
domestic producers are protected from for-
eign competition. The standard infant indus-
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try model begins by assuming that a nation
starts as a small, high-cost cost producer of
some internationally traded good. Costs are
higheitherbecauseproducers cannotgrowbig
enough to realize economies of scale or
because achieving lower costs require the expe-
rience that comeswith cumulatedproduction.
Either way, a tariff that makes imports more
expensive will allow the domestic industry to
lower its costs.159 RPS proponents likewise
argue that requiring the purchase of renew-
ables that are currently expensive will bring
their prices downandpossibly turn the nation
from an importer into an exporter of them.160
In fact, wind turbinemanufacture is already
thoroughly internationalized. General Electric
supplied turbines for 47 percent of domestic
wind installations in 2006.Most of the remain-
der came from overseas sources, including
Siemens (Germany, 23 percent of the total),
Vestas (Denmark, 19 percent) and Mitsubishi
(Japan, 5percent). Some foreignmanufacturers
have openedU.S. plants, and some ofGE’sU.S.
components weremanufactured abroad.161
U.S. renewable energy manufacturers are
alreadycompetitive at theworld level andhard-
ly qualify as infants.Noadvocatehaspresented
evidence that scale economies or experience are
peculiarly important in renewables. Instead,
the industry is experiencing the competition to
innovate and imitate that exists in other tech-
nology-based activities. Competition already
gives renewable energy producers clear incen-
tives to keep costs low and improve their prod-
ucts.162 Inanycase,half of the states (withmost
of the nation’s population) already have RPS,
and there is no evidence that a national stan-
dard would improve progress in cost reduc-
tion.163
Nor is there a valid risk-based justification
for special treatment of renewables thatmight
attract additional investment into them. The
flows of both corporate and venture capital
into renewables suggests that they are not dis-
cernibly riskier than other technology-based
industries. Investors cope with risk by diversi-
fying their holdings, and investors in renew-
ables are no exception. Whether renewables
are under a national RPS, assorted state RPSs,
or no standards at all will notmaterially affect
production risk.
Inone final international variant, somehope
that a national RPS will facilitate America’s
ascent to dominance of the world renewables
markets. One advocate sees it as a necessary
response to renewables-based export policies
that are taking shape in Japan.164 He believes
Americans must emulate the cooperation be-
tween Japan’s manufacturers and government
planners. This popular vision of Japanese invin-
cibility from the 1970s and 1980s died with its
recession and banking crisis of the 1990s.165
Experience gives little reason to expect that
such policy planning (“picking winners”) can
make either nation preeminent in renewables,
where the case for free trade is the same as in
other industries.166 Currently renewables and
their components cross America’s borders in
both directions. Domestic renewable energy
manufacturerswill continue to export those in
which it has a cost advantage and import those
in which it does not.167 International trade in
renewables raises no security issues since they
are ordinary manufactures that no nation can
succeed inmonopolizing.
Questions about the adequacy of support
for research and development in renewables
are closely akin to those of infant industry
protection. Arguments from economic theo-
ry about how the “public goods” characteris-
tics of research and development lead to
inadequate private funding might apply to
any industry. By itself, the theory provides lit-
tle guidance for policy makers seeking to
allocate limited funds, and the range of alter-
natives for protecting intellectual property is
expanding rapidly.168
There is no doubt, however, that funding
for energy R&D has fallen substantially in
recent decades, from 10 percent of all R&D in
1980 to only 2 percent today. As figure 8
shows, private investment in all forms of ener-
gy R&D has declined since the mid-1980s,
while government funding peaked during the
“energy crises” of the late 1970s and has since
settled down to relative constancy. Total R&D
support for renewable power (not shown in
the figure) has been roughly constant in real
29
Experience
gives little reason
to expect that
“picking
winners” can
make either
nation
preeminent in
renewables,
where the case for
free trade is the
same as in other
industries.
3575_PA627_1stClass:3575_PA627_1stClass  10/30/2008  7:09 AM  Page 29
dollars since the mid-1990s, while fossil-fuel
and nuclear R&D have fallen.169
There are two reasons to be unconcerned
about this seeming neglect of renewables.
First, the funds may have more value else-
where. A 2003 study by two renewable advo-
cates examined trends in research funding and
renewable technology improvements and con-
cluded that the net present value of federal
research support for them was -$30 billion.170
Second, we can predict with some certainty
that the great majority of generation capacity
over the coming decades will continue to be
fossil-fuel units. If they account for such a
large fraction of production costs and renew-
ables account for so little, it is possible that the
latters’ current share of R&D is actually too
large. At themargin, spending a given amount
to develop technology that cuts fossil genera-
tion costs by 1percentmayproduce consumer
benefits whose present value exceeds that of
spending the same amount to produce a 10
percent cut in renewable generation costs.
RPS and the Case for Fuel Diversification
Even if electricity prices rise under anation-
al RPS, some computer models project sub-
stantial drops in natural gas prices. As shown
above, the actual effects of a lower price on gas
consumers and producers as a group is zero,
and the lowerpricewill probably increaseuntil
all producers are at least breaking even. Still, if
less power is generated fromnatural gas under
anRPS,natural gaspriceswill become less sen-
sitive to short-term forces such as weather.
That reduction in price volatility is sometimes
viewed as another benefit brought by the RPS.
A risk-averse consumer who buys at the
spotmarket price benefits from lower volatil-
ity. Most small consumers are on fixed rates
(possibly with monthly fuel price adjust-
ments), however, andnever see real-time price
fluctuations. Large consumers can use deriv-
atives transactions tomanage their risks, and
most have little reason to want fixed prices.
Lower volatility is a consequence of tradeoffs
that involve the higher expected price of pow-
er under anRPS and a lower expected price of
natural gas.
Any potential role for renewables as instru-
ments for risk management can also be filled
by other energy sources with relatively stable
prices. These include nuclear, coal, and hydro-
electricplants, aswell asdemandmanagement.
Beyond investments in other conventional
resources, a utility could diversify its renew-
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ables to reduce their intermittency risks, geo-
graphically disperse the ones whose output
depends on weather, or use alternative tech-
nologies (currently in early phases of develop-
ment) such as batteries or compressed air stor-
age.171
Finally, renewable energy only appears to
be a riskless source. Currently most contracts
between wind energy producers and utilities
set a fixed price for every kWh rather than the
market value of the power it replaces at the
moment it is produced. Fixed-price contracts,
however, are risky for ratepayers. The longer a
price is frozen, the larger the expected differ-
ence (either positive or negative) between it
and themarket price.172 Only if consumers are
exceedingly risk averse do such contracts ben-
efit them.173 We still lack studies of the bene-
fits that more normal consumers will reap
frommandated renewables.174
Long-term fixed-price contracts are almost
exclusively seen in regulated industries, where
small users have few if any choices. Utilities
often favor them because, unlike most other
businesses, they can throw the contract risks
onto captive customers who have no choice
but to bear them.175
Foreign Energy Dependence
One final rationale for a national RPS
rests on a claim that renewables can make
important contributions to national security
because they produce power without the
price and deliverability risks of imported
fuels.176 As a general principle, if fuel security
is the problem it should be addressed direct-
ly, for example by strategic storage for mili-
tary use. Attempts to justify (e.g.) tariffs on
oil from risky sources are usually unconvinc-
ing and disregard the possibility of cheaper
alternative policies. NEMS is just another in
a line of demonstrations that have amply
shown that governments have little if any
superiority in predicting developments in
energy markets. Futures traded on the New
York Mercantile Exchange predict gas prices
more accurately than the NEMS gas market
module.177
Ever since Adam Smith first explained the
mutual benefits of trade, economists have
viewed self-sufficiency as a vastly overrated
virtue. Markets allow persons and firms to
specialize in producing those goods in which
they have a comparative advantage and to
diversify their consumption, and the benefits
of this arrangement are as apparent in energy
markets as they are elsewhere.
Even if “energy independence” is for some
reason desirable, a national RPS will have lit-
tle impact on it. If renewables produced 20
percent of the nation’s power, there would be
only minor changes in the allocation of con-
ventional fuels between power production
and other activities. Coal is almost entirely
domestic, and about one-third of U.S. urani-
um is imported but easy to stockpile. Gas
trades in a North American market and liq-
uefied natural gas imports will be minimal
over the near future. Interactions between the
gas pipeline and electric transmission net-
works are becoming more complex but will
probably remain manageable.178
Oil isAmerica’sonly insecureenergy import,
but only 2 percent of its electricity comes from
burning it. Oil-fired plants are restricted to a
few regions and either are or can be made
switchable to gas. There are few possibilities for
substitutionbetweenoil and renewable electric-
ity thatdonotalsohold for conventionallygen-
erated power.
Renewable energy supply is sometimes
thought to be less vulnerable to disruption
than conventional generators, the apparent
reason being that renewable energy facilities
generally have smaller production capacity
than the fossil fueled plants. But as noted ear-
lier, if intermittent renewables (as most of
them will be) become a larger presence the
costs of maintaining reliability (and possibly
the associated risks) will rise. Equipment mal-
functions and lightning strikes occur regular-
ly, but the grid continues to operate in all but
extraordinary conditions.A50MWwind farm
is a less attractive military or terrorist target
than a500MWconventional generator, but in
any situation short of amass attack, either can
be lost without a major (or even a minor)
blackout ensuing. Heavier dependence on
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location-specific renewables like wind and
geothermalmay increase risk since deliverabil-
ity can depend on long and potentially vulner-
able transmission lines.
Conclusion
A national Renewable Portfolio Standard is
being sold as the policy equivalent of a Swiss
Army Knife, capable of resolving or ameliorat-
ingalmost anyproblem its supporters canenvi-
sion. In reality, an RPS is either a redundant
solution to problems that markets are already
taking care of (high fossil fuel prices) or a poor
intervention for resolving problems that mar-
kets can handle only imperfectly. Simple eco-
nomicsandstraightforwardobservationsuffice
to make the arguments in favor of an RPS
untenable.
After 35 years of governmental and corpo-
rate support, renewable energy remains large-
ly unable to pass a market test. Wind alone
will account for most of the compliance with
state standards (to the limited extent that
such compliance is occurring), and evenwind
power’s more enthusiastic advocates recog-
nize that it will continue to be uneconomic
unless given substantial subsidies. Solar pow-
er is a popular dream, encouraged by the
media, but the reality will be wind turbines
taller than the Statue of Liberty.
Renewables currently produce under 3 per-
cent of America’s power, close to their market
share of 15 years ago. The sheer size and dura-
bility of the installed generation base ensures
that even if renewables become competitive,
theywill remain a small part of the power sup-
ply mix for decades. Their effects on reliability
are at best ambiguous, and the intermittent
units that will account for most RPS compli-
ance impose additional capital (transmission)
and operating (reserves) costs on a power sys-
tem. Attempts to project their impact 20 years
ahead are plagued by inadequate data applied
to grandiose models whose forecasting abili-
ties remain poor.
It is hard to imagine an instrument more
poorly suited than an RPS for the implemen-
tation of environmental policy. Few if any
proposals have been accompanied by a rea-
soned cost-benefit analysis. An RPS does not
set objectives for individual pollutants,
applies to only one industry, takes the ineffi-
cient path of setting design standards, has lit-
tle respect for geographic differences, and is
largely incompatible with the growing ratio-
nality of environmental regulation.
Non-environmental rationales for a nation-
al RPS fare just as poorly. One easy way to
appreciate the gulf between RPS and coherent
policy is to examine RPS advocates’ frequent
emphasis on “jobs” that are “created” by
increasing the number of workers assigned to
less productive tasks. Equally striking are the
elementary fallacies offered by RPS advocates
about international trade policy and domestic
populationmovements. All energy sources car-
ry risks that cannot be eliminated by contract-
ing at fixed prices, but can be concealed.
Regulation has long been a stage on which
interest groups play out their wealth-transfer-
ring dramas. Renewables and RPS are just the
latest scripts for them to improvise from.
Instead of putting regulation on a more ratio-
nal basis, RPS will further politicize it. There is
little reason to expect that utilities’ responses to
a national program will differ from their non-
compliancewith state standards, and every rea-
son to expect that those in deficit will pay few
penalties. Finally, anydebate over a federalRPS
will take place against a backdrop of a largely
unjustified public disillusion with experiments
in electrical competition. The behavior of
California’s legislators, regulators and utilities
as theymanipulate their state’sRPS lawhasone
importantmessage for the nation: If formulat-
edandmanagedwell, anRPScanbeofgreataid
in reestablishing the same utility monopolies
and regulatory coalitions that made competi-
tion necessary in the first place.
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